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“United States government leadership is critical if we are to succeed in 
eliminating the threat of drugs in sports.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, a syringe was sent anonymously to the United States Anti-Doping 
Agency (USADA) containing what was discovered to be tetrahydrogestrinone 
(THG), a “designer” steroid that was engineered to be undetectable in standard 
drug tests.2  The entity that allegedly manufactured and distributed THG, the 
Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO), came under grand jury 
investigation for violations of numerous federal laws.3  Information obtained as 
part of the investigation contained the names of several elite amateur and 
professional athletes who allegedly had used THG, including several Olympic-
caliber track and field athletes.4  As the BALCO scandal unfolded and the 
2004 Athens Olympic Games approached, USADA as well as many members 
of Congress and the Executive Branch became concerned that these track and 
field athletes might not be caught.  Both USADA and the federal government 
were determined to ensure that the United States sent a “clean” team to the 
Athens Olympics.5  To that end, a Senate Committee subpoenaed Department 
of Justice documents related to the BALCO investigation, which included the 
names of the track and field athletes in question, and turned them over to 
 
 1. Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs on the Health of Athletes and Athletic 
Competition: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 106th Cong. 23 (1999), 
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_senate_hearings& 
docid=f:75594.pdf [hereinafter Effects of Drugs Hearing] (statement of General Barry R. 
McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy). 
 2. Richard McLaren, The CAS Ad Hoc Division at the Athens Olympic Games, 15 MARQ. 
SPORTS L. REV. 175, 176 (2004).  Olympic sprinter Marion Jones’s former coach Trevor Graham 
later admitted being the anonymous sender.  Lance Williams & Mark Fainaru-Wada, How a 
Syringe Ushered in a Major Sports Scandal: Coach Acknowledged He Gave Evidence to 
Investigators, S.F. CHRON., July 23, 2004, at A15; see also Adrian Wilairat, Faster, Higher, 
Stronger?  Federal Efforts to Criminalize Anabolic Steroids and Steroid Precursors, 8 J. HEALTH 
CARE L. & POL’Y 377, 385 (2005). 
 3. McLaren, supra note 2, at 176. 
 4. See id. at 176–77. 
 5. See Owen Slot, United States Risk Losing Race Against Time to Keep Athens Clean, 
TIMES (London), Apr. 29, 2004, at 46; John Niyo, USOC Establishes Lofty Standards for 
Olympics: But Barriers Could Hinder Expectation of 100 Medals, DETROIT NEWS, May 6, 2004, 
at 1E. 
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USADA.6  Relying on these documents, USADA pursued and ultimately 
secured sanctions against several athletes7 for what it deemed to be “non-
analytical positives,”8 that is, where the athlete did not fail a drug test but 
where there was some evidence of an attempt to cheat.9 
USADA’s aggressive pursuit of athletes allegedly involved in the BALCO 
scandal, and the federal government’s involvement in these efforts, sparked 
enormous controversy.10  Critics of USADA’s actions asserted that USADA 
was not respecting athletes’ constitutional due process rights, and at least one 
athlete, Marion Jones, threatened to sue USADA if it sanctioned her based on a 
“non-analytical positive.”11  As stated at the time by one sports commentator, 
“You get an uneasy feeling from watching [USADA] . . . . You get the feeling 
they’d waive the U.S. Constitution if they could—which is a pretty unsettling 
thing to feel about an organization that is funded by U.S. taxpayer dollars and a 
grant from the White House.”12  USADA, on the other hand, has suggested that 
it is a private, non-governmental organization that is not bound by the 
constraints of the Constitution.13  Amid such controversy, it is not at all clear 
what USADA’s legal status is for constitutional purposes.14 
This Article examines USADA and its relationship to the federal 
government to determine whether USADA’s actions could be constrained by 
the Constitution.  While it is clear that USADA has very close ties to the 
federal government, this Article argues that it is not a government entity, and 
in most cases is not engaged in state action.  Accordingly, in the typical doping 
case, constitutional restrictions would not apply to USADA’s conduct.  In 
unique circumstances when the federal government does intervene, however, 
 
 6. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Com., Sci., and Trans., Comm. to Subpoena 
DOJ Documents Relating to Banned Substance Use in Olympics (April 8, 2004), 
http://commerce.senate.gov/newsroom/printable.cfm?id=220726. 
 7. Beau Dure, BALCO Investigation: Key Players, USATODAY.COM, Dec. 13, 2005, 
www.usatoday.com/sports/balco-players.htm. 
 8. 2004 USADA ANN. REP. 1, available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/who/ 
annual_report_2004.pdf. 
 9. McLaren, supra note 2, at 177. 
 10. See Michael Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1203–04 (2005). 
 11. Joel Stein, Chasing the Truth: Track Stars Marion Jones and Her Boyfriend Tim 
Montgomery are Entangled in Steroids Investigations, TIME, June 7, 2004, at 52, 52. 
 12. Sally Jenkins, Due Process? Not for Track Stars, WASH. POST, June 26, 2004, at D1. 
 13. See Travis T. Tygart, Winners Never Dope and Finally, Dopers Never Win: USADA 
Takes Over Drug Testing of United States Olympic Athletes, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 124, 124–25 (2003). 
 14. Michael S. Straubel, Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control Process in 
International Sport, 106 DICK. L. REV. 523, 561 (2002) (“Questions remain, however, over the 
legal and practical status of USADA . . . .”). 
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as it did in the months leading up to the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, there is 
a strong case that USADA’s conduct amounts to state action. 
II.  BACKGROUND—WHY AND HOW USADA WAS CREATED 
A. The Federal Government’s Interest in Drugs and Sports 
In examining whether USADA is a government entity or whether, as a 
private entity, its actions might be attributable to the government, it is 
necessary to consider the “nature and history” of USADA and the importance 
of fighting drug use in sports to the United States Government.15  Moreover, it 
is helpful to understand the significance to USADA of avoiding constitutional 
restrictions. 
1. The Federal Government and the USOC 
Understanding the history of USADA necessarily requires a brief overview 
of the federal government’s relationship with the United States Olympic 
Committee (USOC), from which USADA was created.  The United States, 
unlike many other countries, does not have an official government agency or 
ministry for sports.  This is because, as one commentator has explained, “[t]he 
issue of sports governance does not fit neatly into the U.S. Government 
structure.”16  This does not mean, however, that sports issues are not important 
to the United States Government.  It is in this tension between the structure of 
our government, which tends to leave sports issues to the private sector, and 
our government’s interest in sports, where the USOC, and now USADA, 
operate. 
The USOC, as it exists today, was developed as a result of the Commission 
on Olympic Sports created by President Ford in 1975 to study ways in which 
the United States could be more successful in Olympic competition.17  The 
Commission called on Congress to restructure the USOC so that it would 
function as an institution to centrally coordinate the United States’ amateur 
athletic development.18  This led to the Amateur Sports Act of 1978,19 which 
 
 15. See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 383 (1995) (“Before 
proceeding to consider Lebron’s contention that Amtrak, though nominally a private corporation, 
must be regarded as a Government entity . . . we examine the nature and history of 
Amtrak . . . .”); see also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 
291–95 (2001) (reviewing the history and structure of the TSSAA before analyzing whether its 
actions were “fairly attributable” to the state). 
 16. Panel II: Regulations Governing Drugs and Performance Enhancers in Sports, 12 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 337, 340 (2002) [hereinafter Panel II: Regulations 
Governing Drugs] (statement of Edward Jurith, General Counsel, Office of National Drug 
Control Policy). 
 17. Exec. Order No. 11,868, 3A C.F.R. 174 (1975). 
 18. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 554 (1987). 
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made the USOC a federally-chartered corporation.  The Act gave the USOC 
the exclusive power to coordinate and govern Olympic Movement athletics in 
the United States.20 
Both through formal means, such as providing funding and through the 
oversight requirements of the Amateur Sports Act, and by more informal 
means, the federal government exercises significant influence over the USOC.  
For instance, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prior to the 1980 
Moscow Olympic Games, President Carter and Congress called on the USOC 
to boycott the Games.21  The President, however, made clear that he would 
take all steps necessary to enforce his decision not to send a team to Moscow.22  
Not surprisingly, the USOC voted not to send a team to the Games.23  More 
recently, Congress has taken an interest in reforming the USOC in response to 
allegations of mismanagement and ethical violations.  To this end, in 2003, 
committees in both the House and Senate held several hearings on USOC 
reform, and a group of Senators created an independent commission to 
recommend changes to the USOC’s structure.  During one such hearing, Bill 
Martin, acting president of the USOC, told Congress: “All of this comes down 
to the question of just what Congress, to whom we are ultimately accountable, 
wants the USOC to do.  Unfortunately, it seems that individual Members have 
differing views on what our mission should be . . . .”24  Martin further stated 
that “[w]e need Congress’ help in developing and implementing an 
organizational restructuring plan . . . .”25  Thus, although the USOC operates in 
many ways as a private corporation, it is nevertheless subject to considerable 
government oversight and influence.  As will be explained below, the federal 
government’s influence over the USOC allowed Congress and the Office of 
 
 19. Pub. L. No. 95-606, 92 Stat. 3045 (1978) (codified as amended at 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–
220529 (2000)). 
 20. S.F. Arts, 483 U.S. at 554. 
 21. See H.R. Con. Res. 249, 96th Cong. (1980); Alan Abrahamson, Pointless to Some: Time 
Hasn’t Healed Everything for the 1980 U.S. Olympians Who Didn’t Have a Chance to Compete, 
L.A. TIMES, July 19, 2005, at D1. 
 22. Barry Lorge, President Threatens to Bar U.S. Athletes, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1980, at 
A1. 
 23. See DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1182 (D.D.C. 1980), aff’d, 
701 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (declining to enjoin the USOC from carrying out its resolution of 
April 12, 1980, not to send a team to Moscow). 
 24. Does the U.S. Olympic Committee’s Organizational Structure Impede its Mission?: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. 
on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 26 (2003), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ 
cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.52&filename=86055.pdf&directory=/disk2/wais/data/ 
108_house_hearings [hereinafter USOC Organizational Structure Hearing] (statement of William 
C. Martin, Acting President, USOC). 
 25. Id. at 27. 
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National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to take the lead role in establishing 
USADA. 
2. The Fight Against Performance-Enhancing Drug Use in Amateur 
Sports 
In addition to the federal government’s considerable interest in the USOC, 
both Congress and the Executive Branch also have had an interest in 
performance-enhancing drug use in sports.  For instance, in 1989, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee held hearings on “the steroid abuse problem in America” 
following the 1988 Olympic gold medal performance of Canadian sprinter Ben 
Johnson, who was later stripped of his medal after it was discovered that he 
had used steroids.26  At that hearing, it was stressed that steroid use by elite 
athletes undermines important Olympic ideals and has a substantial negative 
effect on young people.27  Similar concerns were voiced by the Subcommittee 
on Crime of the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary during 
its hearing on steroid-related legislation,28 involving the Anabolic Steroids 
Control Act of 1990,29 which amended the Controlled Substances Act30 in an 
attempt to further restrict the use of anabolic steroids.31 
Government concern over performance-enhancing drug use in sports 
continued, and in the late 1990s ONDCP and Congress made fighting drug use 
in sports a top priority.  The issue gained greater prominence at this time 
because of persistent reports of performance-enhancing drug use by elite 
athletes and the fact that such use, in the view of many, was leading to an 
increase in the use of performance-enhancing drugs, including steroids, by 
young people.  As stated by Senator Ron Wyden in a 1999 hearing on doping 
in sports, “[W]e are seeing a public health crisis with respect to these drugs in 
American youths.  It seems that now the same number of kids using some kind 
of steroid, is the number that are using cocaine.”32  General Barry McCaffrey, 
 
 26. See Steroids in Amateur and Professional Sports—The Medical and Social Costs of 
Steroid Abuse: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 101 (1989) 
[hereinafter Abuse of Steroids Hearings] (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).  The Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary noted that the Steroid Trafficking Act was necessary because “illegal 
steroids trafficking remains a major drug problem in the United States.”  S. REP. NO. 101-433, at 
2 (1990). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Hearing on H.R. 4658 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
101st Cong. 10 (1990) [hereinafter Anabolic Steroids Control Act Hearing] (statement of Rep. 
Mel Levine). 
 29. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4851.  The legislation supplemented the provisions of the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which made the illegal sale of steroids a felony.  See Pub. L. No. 
100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). 
 30. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2000). 
 31. See Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990 § 1902. 
 32. Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden). 
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former head of ONDCP, underscored this point, stating at the same hearing 
that there was wide-spread use of steroids among young adolescents.  He noted 
that about 550,000 young people used steroids in 1995, with the number 
expected to grow.33  Moreover, it was not just steroid use by Olympic 
Movement athletes that concerned the government, but use of such drugs by 
professional athletes as well.34  Accordingly, many members of Congress and 
particularly the ONDCP became very interested in fighting doping in sports.35 
The fight against doping in sports also became more urgent because of the 
growing international perception that the United States was not doing enough 
to fight the use of performance-enhancing drugs by its Olympic athletes.36  As 
stated by Dr. Johann Olav Koss, the Athlete Representative to the IOC and the 
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA): 
The perception internally is bad about the USA, and about what the USOC or 
other national governing bodies have done to protect their athletes in 
participating and helping them cheat . . . . This is the perception . . . . There is 
no way you ask anyone outside the United States to believe that American 
athletes have not been cheating in the past.37 
 
 33. Id. at 9 (statement of Barry McCaffrey). 
 34. See Abuse of Steroids Hearings, supra note 26, at 2 (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden). 
 35. This interest continues today.  Indeed, the issue of drugs in sports even gained the 
attention of President Bush, who mentioned the issue in his 2004 State of the Union Address.  He 
stated that 
[t]he use of performance-enhancing drugs like steroids in baseball, football, and other 
sports is dangerous, and it sends the wrong message, that there are shortcuts to 
accomplishment and that performance is more important than character. So tonight I call 
on team owners, union representatives, coaches, and players to take the lead, to send the 
right signal, to get tough, and to get rid of steroids now. 
Pres. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 94, 100 (Jan. 
20, 2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2004_ 
presidential_documents&docid=pd26ja04_txt-10.pdf.  More recently, Congress passed and 
President Bush signed the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004.  Pub. L. No. 108-358, 118 Stat. 
1661 (2004).  The Act added certain anabolic steroid precursors to the list of controlled 
substances, required a review of the Federal sentencing guidelines for offenses involving anabolic 
steroids, and established a grant program in support of anabolic steroid education.  Id.  Moreover, 
as stated recently by Congressman Henry Waxman, “There is an absolute correlation between the 
culture of steroids in the major league clubhouse and the culture of steroids in high school gyms.  
If we can remove steroids from the clubhouse, we will fix the problems in school locker rooms.”  
Press Release, John McCain, McCain, Davis, and Waxman Announce Introduction of “Clean 
Sports Act of 2005” (May 24, 2005), http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
Newscenter.ViewPressRelease&Content_id=1579; see also Sarah Baldwin, Note and Comment, 
Performance Enhancing Drug Use in Olympic Sport: A Comparison of the United States and 
Australian Approaches, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 265, 275 (2002). 
 36. Tygart, supra note 13, at 124. 
 37. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS, PROCEEDINGS: FIRST MEETING 
OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS 36 (Dec. 7, 2000) [hereinafter 
WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE] (statement of Dr. Johann Olav Koss). 
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This perception was fueled by the structure of the United States’ prior anti-
doping program, the National Anti-Doping Program (NADP).  The NADP 
administered drug testing through the USOC, but relied on each sport’s 
National Governing Body (NGB) to prosecute athletes for doping violations 
under the NGB’s own administrative procedures.38  As a result, the entities that 
were charged with selecting the finest athletes for Olympic and international 
competition, the USOC and NGBs, also administered drug testing and meted 
out the sanctions.  Critics argued that the USOC and NGBs therefore had an 
inherent conflict of interest that prevented them from administering drug tests 
and punishing dopers effectively.39 
The need to bolster the credibility of United States’ anti-doping efforts, 
combined with the perceived public health effects of doping by elite athletes, 
spurred Congress and ONDCP to press for immediate change to the way anti-
doping was approached in the United States.  These concerns were even more 
urgent because the United States, as host for the Salt Lake City Olympic 
Games in 2002, wanted to ensure that it sponsored a “clean” Olympic 
Games.40 
3. The National Anti-Doping Strategy 
Serious government efforts to address doping in sports came together in 
1999, when ONDCP announced its “National Strategy” to combat drug use 
and doping in sports.41  ONDCP began working on the issue of doping in 
sports after the 1998 Nagano Olympic Games, where, in the words of ONDCP 
Director Barry McCaffrey, “an athlete who tested positive for marijuana was 
awarded the Olympic gold and hoisted up on the medal platform as a hero to 
all the world’s youth.”42  The National Strategy, which was in development for 
over a year,43 was premised on the belief that “the United States government 
[had] a responsibility to undertake efforts at the national, binational and 
international levels to strengthen anti-doping regimes.”44  The National 
Strategy was meant to explain the federal efforts to combat doping in sport,45 
and it was developed by an inter-agency working group in consultation with 
various “stakeholders,” including athletes and the USOC.46  The so-called 
Federal Team that worked on the strategy included the Secretary of the 
 
 38. Tygart, supra note 13, at 126. 
 39. Id. at 126–27; see also Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 23 (statement of Barry 
McCaffrey). 
 40. Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 10 (statement of Barry McCaffrey). 
 41. Id. at 13, 18–23. 
 42. Id. at 13. 
 43. Id. at 14. 
 44. Id. at 20. 
 45. See Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 20–21. 
 46. Id. at 18–20. 
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Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), as well as other HHS 
officials, and officials from the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Department of 
State, and the White House.47  Although the Government had clear objectives 
in mind when the National Strategy was announced, McCaffrey noted that 
ONDCP had to respect the view that the federal government should not 
intervene in amateur sports issues.48  The goal was for the National Strategy to 
significantly change the United States’ approach to doping prior to the 2000 
Sydney Summer Olympic games.49 
In announcing the National Strategy, ONDCP asserted that drug use and 
doping in sport had become an “international crisis.”50  ONDCP noted that at 
the Olympic level, doping had grown to a point where it was hurting honest 
athletes who could not successfully compete against those who used 
performance-enhancing drugs.51  In addition, those who were successful had 
their victories questioned.52  Beyond the effects at the Olympic level, ONDCP 
stressed that doping had an impact on children, as the use of performance-
enhancing drugs by children continued to grow.53  The use of such drugs was 
of particular concern because performance-enhancing drugs like steroids were 
believed to have serious health consequences, and ONDCP noted that doping 
in sports was “perceived” to be a major public health crisis.54  Additionally, 
ONDCP asserted that trafficking in performance-enhancing drugs was a 
burgeoning criminal industry.55  Because there were significant and 
widespread effects of doping, it advocated for “a new approach” to address the 
problem.56 
ONDCP specifically listed several areas that needed to be addressed.  First, 
ONDCP stated that because professional sports did not ban a number of 
performance-enhancing drugs that were banned in international competition, 
there were international concerns over the United States’ commitment to anti-
doping.57  In addition, ONDCP stated that the USOC’s anti-doping program 
was insufficient because of the inherent conflicts of interest and a failure to 
effectively administer no-notice, out-of-competition testing.58  While ONDCP 
noted that these issues were the basis for international criticism, it was also of 
 
 47. Id. at 19. 
 48. Id. at 12. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
 51. Id. at 15. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 15–16. 
 54. Id. at 16. 
 55. Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 17. 
 56. Id. at 18. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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major concern to Olympic sponsors and the American public, who, according 
to ONDCP, were viewing the Olympics as “yet another fraud on the public.”59 
ONDCP’s Strategy sought to address these concerns with several specific 
proposals.  Most significantly, on the national level, ONDCP asserted that an 
effective anti-doping program might require federal oversight and reporting 
such that there would be appropriate federal review and certification.60  
Moreover, through the National Strategy, ONDCP contemplated working with 
the USOC and others to “facilitate the development of an externalized and 
fully independent domestic anti-doping mechanism or body (including 
research, testing, and adjudication).”61  The strategy thus envisioned an 
effective and accountable “U.S. agency” with “certain governmental or quasi-
governmental powers.”62  ONDCP asserted that governmental status would 
improve the accountability of anti-doping efforts and significantly enhance the 
United States’ credibility.63  ONDCP stated that while it was not advocating 
the creation of additional “bureaucracy,” it did hope to work with Congress on 
developing the proposed anti-doping institution.64  ONDCP’s strategy also 
advocated for more federal support for advanced research into doping to 
develop better drug tests.65 
The ONDCP Strategy also involved significant international efforts to 
develop an “independent and accountable international anti-doping agency” 
that engages in year-round no-notice testing of athletes.66  ONDCP asserted 
that this agency should work to deter doping by having no statute of limitations 
on doping offenses (so that athletes could lose their titles at any time if 
evidence becomes available that they cheated), a policy of preserving samples 
for at least ten years so they could be tested if and when new drug tests become 
available, and an aggressive research agenda to remain one step ahead of 
cheaters.67 
ONDCP stated that as a follow up to its announcement of the National 
Strategy, it would form a task force chaired by ONDCP and other executive 
branch officials, and in cooperation with Congress, move forward on the 
proposed reforms.68  To that end, Executive Order 13,165 established the 
White House Task Force on Drug Use in Sports, which included the Director 
of ONDCP, the Secretary of HHS, the Olympic Task Force Vice Chairs, and 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 20. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 21. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 22. 
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representatives appointed by the Department of Labor, the President’s Council 
on Physical Fitness and Sports, the Office of Management and Budget, the 
National Security Council, the Department of State, the Department of the 
Treasury, the Department of Education, the Department of Justice, the 
Department of Transportation, the National Institute on Drug Abuse, and the 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.69  The purpose 
of the Task Force was to “develop recommendations for the President on 
further executive and legislative actions that can be undertaken to address the 
problem of doping and drug use in sports.”70  The Task Force was convened in 
December, 2000, after the formation of the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WADA) and USADA.71  The Task Force discussed further challenges in the 
fight against doping, with one of the key conclusions being that USADA, to be 
effective, needed “some instrumentality of the United States status.”72  As 
stated by Barry McCaffrey, “We are going to have to make sure we do have an 
agency that can act as a representative of the U.S. Government.”73 
B. The Government’s Efforts to Establish Domestic and International Anti-
Doping Agencies 
As noted above, key components of ONDCP’s National Strategy were the 
establishment of both an international anti-doping agency independent of the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the establishment of a domestic 
anti-doping agency that was independent of the USOC.74  It was contemplated 
that these entities would work in a coordinated way and that the United States 
government would have influence with both.75 
1. The Creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency 
To be sure, the effort to establish WADA was a multi-national one, 
including the governments of Australia, Great Britain, France, and Germany, 
among others.76  The United States government, however, as part of the 
National Strategy, played a significant role in the effort.77 
 
 69. Exec. Order No. 13,165, 3 C.F.R. 288 (2001), reprinted in 21 U.S.C. § 1701 (2003). 
 70. 3 C.F.R. 288, § 2(b). 
 71. See Christopher Smith, 2002 Backdrop for Anti-drug Message, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 
6, 2000, at A6. 
 72. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 83 (closing remarks by Barry McCaffrey). 
 73. Id. at 83–84. 
 74. See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text. 
 75. See Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 23 (statement by Barry McCaffrey). 
 76. See id. at 22. 
 77. See Panel II: Regulations Governing Drugs, supra note 16, at 340 (statement of Edward 
Jurith: “At ONDCP, we led an initiative in the last Administration working with other nations and 
the International Olympic Committee . . . to create the World Anti-Doping Agency . . . .”). 
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In the late 1990s, the United States was leading a movement to effectuate 
change within the IOC, which was viewed by many United States government 
officials as corrupt.78  The United States had long wanted an Olympic 
Movement drug testing entity that was independent of the IOC;79 however, at 
least some members of the government believed that progress in the fight 
against doping could not be made until larger questions of IOC reform were 
resolved.80  The United States Government stepped up its efforts in this regard 
in February 1999, when a delegation of government officials and others within 
the United States Olympic Movement, led by ONDCP Director Barry 
McCaffrey, went to Lausanne, Switzerland, for the World Conference on 
Doping in Sport.81  Out of this conference came the Lausanne Declaration, 
which called for an independent International Anti-Doping Agency to be 
established before the Sydney Games in 2000.82  There were significant 
concerns, however, that what the IOC was proposing for such an entity was, as 
Barry McCaffrey reported to the Senate Committee, “more public relations 
ploy than public policy solution” and that the proposal did not meet the United 
States’ requirements.83  Among the United States’ concerns were that the 
proposed agency was not truly independent from the IOC, was not transparent, 
and that it failed to give governments who would substantially fund the 
agency, including the United States, an adequate role in the agency’s 
leadership and policy-making process.84  McCaffrey told the Senate 
Committee that ONDCP had started to develop an “international consensus 
approach” to pressure the IOC into making changes to the proposal.85  
McCaffrey stated that he planned to lead a team of Executive Branch officials 
to Europe in order to work with United States allies and international 
organizations, such as the U.N. Drug Control Programme and the Council of 
Europe, in an effort to build consensus to force the IOC to change its proposal 
for an independent anti-doping agency that met the United States’ goals.86  
Moreover, McCaffrey told the Senate Committee that if the IOC was not 
responsive to ONDCP’s reform efforts, then “we will need your support to 
force change.  In short, your leadership and that of the Committee will be 
 
 78. See, e.g., Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 27 (statement of Sen. Wyden: “I 
think that there is an extraordinary record of foot-dragging with respect to the International 
Committee. . . . They have always found a way to duck out of the specifics . . . which are 
essentially transparency and accountability.”). 
 79. See id. at 11 (opening statement of Chairman, Sen. John McCain). 
 80. Id. at 28 (testimony of Barry McCaffrey). 
 81. Id. at 48 (statement of Frank Shorter, U.S. Olympic Gold Medalist). 
 82. Id. at 63–64 (statement of Richard Pound, First Vice President of the IOC). 
 83. Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 21 (statement of Barry McCaffrey). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 22. 
 86. Id. 
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critical to the creation of a truly independent agency and a fully effective 
international anti-doping regime.”87  McCaffrey led another delegation to a 
Summit of Governments in Australia later that year once again to address the 
problem of doping in Olympic sports.88  In addition, Senator Ted Stevens 
previously had traveled to Switzerland to meet with the head of the IOC, Juan 
Antonio Samaranch, regarding the issue of doping.89  Henry Kissinger worked 
with the ONDCP, as well, to effectuate change generally within the IOC.90 
WADA was ultimately established and began operations on November 10, 
1999.91  Its mission is to “combine[] the resources of sports and governments 
to enhance, supplement, and coordinate existing efforts to educate athletes 
about the harms of doping, reinforce the ideal of fair play, and sanction those 
who cheat themselves and their sport.”92  WADA receives its funding from the 
IOC and world governments.93  In August 2000, President Clinton, through 
Executive Order 13,165, facilitated the United States government’s role in 
WADA.94  The Executive Order stated that the Administration was adopting a 
policy “to take the steps needed to help eliminate illicit or otherwise banned 
drug use and doping in sports at the State, national, and international level.”95  
The Executive Order stated that as part of these efforts, “the United States has 
played a leading role in the formation of a World Anti-Doping Agency . . . .”96  
The Executive Order authorized the Director of ONDCP “to serve as the 
United States Government’s representative on the WADA board.”97  It also 
authorized federal employees, acting in their “official capacit[ies],” to serve on 
WADA committees or advisory committees and serve as experts to the 
organization.98 
The United States has a significant leadership role in WADA.  For 
instance, the United States sits on WADA’s Foundation Board.99  The 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 8. 
 89. Id. at 7 (statement of Sen. Stevens). 
 90. Id. at 19 (statement of Barry McCaffrey). 
 91. World Anti-Doping Agency History, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page 
Category.id=253 (last visited Nov. 7, 2005). 
 92. World Anti-Doping Agency Mission, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page 
Category.id=255 (last visited Nov. 7, 2005). 
 93. World Anti-Doping Agency Finance, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page 
Category.id=259 (last visited  Nov. 7, 2005) (stating that the first two years of WADA’s existence 
were funded by the Olympic Movement, and since 2002 “equally from the Olympic movement 
and the governments of the world”). 
 94. Exec. Order No. 13,165, 3 C.F.R. 288 (2001), reprinted in 21 U.S.C. § 1701 (2003). 
 95. 3 C.F.R. 288, § 1. 
 96. Id. § 3(a). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. § 3(c). 
 99. Id. § 3(a). 
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Foundation Board is WADA’s “supreme decision making body,”100 and it has 
the authority to supervise the activities of WADA, as well as to designate the 
individuals who will serve on the Executive Committee, which handles the 
day-to-day operations of WADA.101  In addition, the United States is one of the 
five nations represented on WADA’s Executive Committee, and it recently 
chaired WADA’s Ethics and Education Committee.102  The United States, 
along with many other governments, pays dues to WADA pursuant to a 
previously agreed-upon formula.103  These dues are paid through ONDCP.104  
Stated ONDCP Director Barry McCaffrey: “That we created a World Anti-
Doping Agency in short order is astonishing.  From its origins as a house-
tethered goat of the IOC, it’s become an institution that in the coming several 
years . . . will serve our purposes well.”105 
In addition to its efforts to establish WADA, the United States Government 
“played a leadership role” in drafting the World Anti-Doping Code 
(WADC),106 which was adopted on March 5, 2003.107  The Code has been 
adopted by all major international sports federations and more than one 
hundred countries.108  The Code is administered by WADA109 and is what 
USADA follows in testing and sanctioning United States athletes.110  The 
United States, along with other governments, agreed to continue funding 
 
 100. World Anti-Doping Agency Composition: Introduction, http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=258 (last visited Nov. 7, 2005). 
 101. Id.; see also Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 75 (Draft Mission Statement and 
Constating Document for World Anti-Doping Agency, Art. 11). 
 102. Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime: Evaluating Major League Baseball’s Efforts to 
Eradicate Steroid Use: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. 140 (2005), 
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21& 
filename=20323.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/109_house_hearings [hereinafter Restoring 
Faith in America’s Pastime] (statement of Dr. Gary Wadler). 
 103. See Memorandum of Understanding, Executive Office of the President Office of 
National Drug Control Policy–World Anti-Doping Agency, FY 2004. 
 104. Id.  Most recently, in its FY 2005 budget request, ONDCP asked for $1 million for 
WADA membership dues.  WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: FY 2005 
BUDGET SUMMARY 90 (2004), http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ 
budgetsum04/budgetsum05.pdf. 
 105. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 10 (keynote remarks of Barry 
McCaffrey). 
 106. Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime, supra note 102, at 136 (testimony of Dr. Gary 
Wadler). 
 107. John T. Wendt, WADA, Doping and THG, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Winter 2004, at 1, 28. 
 108. Id. at 28. 
 109. World Anti-Doping Agency Mission, supra note 92. 
 110. UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 2005 GUIDE TO PROHIBITED SUBSTANCES AND 
PROHIBITED METHODS OF DOPING 1 (Larry D. Bowers et al. eds., 2005), available at 
http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/what/usada_guide.pdf [hereinafter 2005 USADA GUIDE 
TO PROHIBITED SUBSTANCES]; see Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime, supra note 102, at 136 
(testimony of Dr. Gary Wadler). 
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WADA as part of the International Convention Against Doping in Sport, 
which will be presented to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO)’s General Conference in the near future.111 
2. The Government’s Role in Creating USADA 
While the United States Government worked on the international level to 
create WADA, it also was laying the foundation at home for the establishment 
of USADA.  USADA states that it was formed as a result of the 
recommendations of the USOC Select Task Force on Drug Externalization 
(USOC Task Force).112  However, this explanation does not account fully for 
the important role ONDCP and Congress played in USADA’s creation.  
Specifically, much of the impetus for and effort to create USADA was from 
ONDCP, with strong Congressional backing, long before the USOC Task 
Force had even convened. 
As noted above, the notion of an anti-doping entity independent of the 
USOC was a featured part of ONDCP’s National Strategy and had strong 
Congressional approval.113  During the October 1999 hearing in which the 
National Strategy was presented, Senator John McCain stated that the “gross 
shortcomings” of the USOC’s anti-doping program had been exposed, and 
a consensus on the necessary elements of an approach to curbing the use of 
performance enhancing drugs exists. 
The first step is the establishment of an independent or external agency to 
perform year-round, out-of-competition testing for banned substances. . . . 
Testing must be universal in that all athletes wishing to compete in the 
Olympic games should be required to submit to the testing regime established 
by this independent agency. . . . 
Finally, a comprehensive and sustained anti-drug and sports ethics education 
program should be developed and implemented.114 
This point was echoed by ONDCP.  In announcing the National Strategy, 
ONDCP Director Barry McCaffrey stated that “[w]orking with the USOC and 
other stakeholders to facilitate the development of an externalized and fully 
independent domestic anti-doping mechanism or body” was “[a]mong the key 
initiatives at the national level.”115 
 
 111. World Anti-Doping Agency Finance, supra note 93; see also UNESCO General 
Conference, International Convention Against Doping in Sport, Sept. 6, 2005, 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001405/140597e.pdf (Final Draft). 
 112. 2001 USADA ANN. REP. 2, available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/who/ 
annual_report_2001.pdf. 
 113. See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text. 
 114. Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 1–2 (opening statement of Sen. John McCain). 
 115. Id. at 20 (statement of Barry McCaffrey). 
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Both ONDCP and Congress had direct influence on how USADA would 
be structured and what its mission would be.  While briefing Congress on the 
National Strategy, McCaffrey commented on the USOC Task Force’s work, 
stating that the USOC’s early proposals were “pretty good work. . . . I do not 
think it is at the end of its developmental cycle, but the U.S. Olympic 
Committee has gone for the notion of drug testing externalization.”116  At that 
same hearing, Bill Hybl, then-president of the USOC, reported to the 
Committee on the progress of the USOC Task Force and its recommendations 
to date.117  The Committee also heard testimony from athletes and other 
experts on the USOC Task Force’s proposals and solicited their views on how 
a new anti-doping program should be structured.118  Indeed, in addition to the 
broad outlines of an anti-doping entity, Congress was concerned with details 
such as for how long, and where, athletes’ urine specimens should be kept and 
stored.119  Both ONDCP and Congress wanted to see an anti-doping agency 
established before the 2000 Sydney Olympics.120 
The work of the government, and particularly ONDCP, in creating 
USADA was underscored by USADA’s first chair, Frank Shorter.  In his 
presentation as part of the White House Task Force on Drug Use in Sports in 
December, 2000, Mr. Shorter explained: 
[The formation of USADA] really was through the efforts of Barry McCaffrey 
and the White House in the United States, as the result of having gone to the 
drug summit in Lausanne eighteen months ago and determining that there 
needed to be a totally independent drug testing agency in the United States for 
all Olympic sports . . . .121 
Mr. Shorter noted that he became involved in the effort because of his previous 
work with Barry McCaffrey, including attending as part of ONDCP’s 
delegation the Lausanne Summit.122  Significantly, Mr. Shorter highlighted 
ONDCP’s role in influencing the USOC and establishing USADA by stating 
that “through [ONDCP’s] Rob Housman’s work behind the scenes, the 
elements of this new agency that we discussed and formulated in Lausanne 
eighteen months ago, happened to show up in the task force report of the U.S. 
Olympic Committee in the creati[on] of this agency.”123 
 
 116. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
 117. Id. at 52–56 (statement of Bill Hybl). 
 118. E.g., id. at 108–12 (memorandum of Doriane Lambelet Coleman). 
 119. See Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 25 (questioning by Sen. Ted Stevens 
directed to Barry McCaffrey). 
 120. Id. at 12 (statement of Barry McCaffrey). 
 121. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 15 (statement of Frank Shorter, USADA 
chair). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (emphasis added).  More recently, in reflecting on USADA’s formation, Jim Scherr 
testified before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation on the “joint 
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Therefore, because of the federal government’s ability to influence the 
USOC, and ONDCP’s behind-the-scenes efforts, it is not at all surprising that 
the USOC Task Force, in December 1999, ultimately recommended that “an 
Independent Organization be created to conduct a comprehensive anti-doping 
program in the United States.”124  Consistent with ONDCP’s National 
Strategy, and the wishes of members of Congress such as Senator McCain, this 
entity was to have responsibility for drug testing all athletes participating in the 
Olympic Movement,125 and the entity was to conduct research and educate the 
public on the effects of doping.126  In addition, initial funding for USADA was 
to come from the USOC and the federal government, but the expectation was 
that for USADA to fulfill the mission outlined for it by ONDCP and the Senate 
Committee, continued funding would have to come from the federal 
government.127  Therefore, it is apparent that, in reality, USADA was not 
simply created as a result of the USOC’s Task Force, but was in fact created 
according to the specific goals laid out by ONDCP.128  In the words of Barry 
McCaffrey, the USOC was really just one of the many “stakeholders” with 
whom ONDCP worked in creating the National Strategy, which featured an 
official testing agency independent from the USOC.129 
 
effort” between the USOC and Congress to address doping in sports, stating that “[w]e think that 
the fruit of this partnership—USADA—has more than fulfilled our early expectations when we 
first discussed the concept nearly six years ago, and believe that with increased federal support it 
will become an even more effective weapon to be used to eradicate this growing national 
problem.”  U.S. Anti-Doping Agency: Hearing on S. 529 Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., and 
Transp., 109th Cong. (2005), http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id 
=1511&wit_id=4275 [hereinafter S. 529 Hearing] (testimony of Jim Scherr, May 24, 2005). 
 124. REPORT OF THE USOC SELECT TASK FORCE ON DRUG EXTERNALIZATION (Dec. 3, 
1999), http://www.runfrankshorter.com/usada.shtml [hereinafter REPORT ON DRUG 
EXTERNALIZATION]. 
 125. Tygart, supra note 13, at 125. 
 126. REPORT ON DRUG EXTERNALIZATION, supra note 124. 
 127. S. 529 Hearing, supra note 123 (testimony of Jim Scherr). 
 128. See Press Release, Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, Addendum to Statement of John 
P. Walters Dir. of Nat’l Drug Control Policy Before the House Comm. On Appropriations, 
Subcomm. On Transp., Treasury and Related Agencies: The Office of Nat’l Drug Control 
Policy’s FY 2004 Budget Request (Apr. 9, 2003), http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/ 
testimony03/040903/add4.html [hereinafter ONDCP 2004 Budget Request].  Indeed, ONDCP has 
since characterized the creation of USADA as a natural extension of the federal government’s 
efforts to combat doping in sports.  See id.  To support its FY 2004 funding request for USADA, 
found under the heading of “Other Federal Drug Control Programs,” ONDCP stated that doping 
and drug use in sports was a growing national problem and that American athletes “at all 
competition levels” are “jeopardizing their health and undermining the core values of sport” by 
using performance-enhancing drugs.  Id.  ONDCP’s request then stated that “[a]s a result, 
USADA was established to lead a comprehensive anti-doping program in the U.S.” 
 129. Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 20 (statement of Barry McCaffrey). 
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From these substantial government efforts, USADA was established and 
began operations on October 1, 2000.130  USADA was created as a private, 
not-for-profit agency that undertakes its duties pursuant to a contract with the 
USOC to administer the United States’ drug testing programs.131  USADA’s 
mission is to preserve “the well-being of Olympic sport, the integrity of 
competition, and ensuring the health of athletes.”132  To that end, USADA 
focuses on the four areas outlined by ONDCP and the Senate Committee: 
education, research, testing, and results management.133  USADA is 
responsible for testing “any athlete who is a member of a NGB.”134  In 
addition, USADA can test “any athlete participating at a competition 
sanctioned by the USOC or a NGB,” or “any athlete who has been named by 
the USOC or [a] NGB [to an Olympic or Pan American team or who] is 
competing in a qualifying event to represent the USOC or [a] NGB in 
international competition.”135  Indeed it has been stated that USADA’s 
authority is broad enough to ensure that it combats all athletic doping within 
the United States Olympic Movement.136  USADA is designated by Congress 
as the United States’ official anti-doping agency.137 
USADA is governed by a nine-member Board of Directors.138  The Board 
consists of a diverse group of individuals from the medical and sports world.139  
The Board has the authority to elect its own members.140  None of the 
individuals on the Board of Directors is directly affiliated with the United 
States government, although it was contemplated initially that the ONDCP 
director would be able to submit nominations for the board.141  Currently, 
Congress is proposing legislation that would involve ONDCP in drug testing 
programs for professional sports leagues and the NCAA.142 
 
 130. USADA History, http://www.usantidoping.org/who/history.html (last visited Nov. 7, 
2005). 
 131. Tygart, supra note 13, at 127. 
 132. 2004 USADA ANN. REP., supra note 8, at 3. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Tygart, supra note 13, at 128. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 129. 
 137. Act of Nov. 12, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-67, § 644, 115 Stat. 514, 555 (“The Congress of 
the United States recognizes the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) as the official 
anti-doping agency for Olympic, Pan American, and Paralympic sport in the United States.”). 
 138. USADA Board of Directors, http://www.usantidoping.org/who/meet/board.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2005). 
 139. See id. 
 140. USADA History, supra note 130. 
 141. See Effects of Drugs Hearing, supra note 1, at 103 (Bill Hybl’s response to Sen. John 
McCain’s written questions). 
 142. See Press Release, John McCain, supra note 35. 
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C. Why USADA’s Designation as a Private Entity is Important 
The Supreme Court has explained that, with respect to constitutional due 
process protections, “this Court in the Civil Rights Cases affirmed the essential 
dichotomy . . .  between deprivation by the State, subject to scrutiny under its 
provisions, and private conduct, ‘however discriminatory or wrongful,’ against 
which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield.”143  The importance to 
USADA of operating as a private entity, in a climate free of constitutional 
restrictions, is therefore clear.  If USADA is simply a private entity, an athlete 
charged with a doping violation would be entitled to no more due process than 
what USADA144 and the Amateur Sports Act145 provide.146  If, however, 
USADA were a state actor, an athlete so accused would be entitled to 
constitutional due process protections.147 
Even before USADA was created, there were concerns that the United 
States would not be able to establish an effective anti-doping agency because 
of constitutional rights of privacy and due process.148  After USADA was 
created, at least some within ONDCP believed that the due process protections 
offered by the Amateur Sports Act to an athlete should be changed so that an 
athlete suspected of doping could be removed immediately from competition 
before a hearing took place.149  Indeed, although acknowledging his views 
were “politically incorrect,” Mickey Ibarra, Assistant to President Bill Clinton 
 
 143. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (citations omitted); see also 
Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass’n, 884 F.2d 524, 530 (1989) (“It is axiomatic that the fifth 
amendment applies to and restricts ‘only the Federal Government and not private persons.’”) 
(citation omitted); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (holding that with regard to 
private conduct, the Constitution does not allow for due process protections, “no matter how 
unfair that conduct may be”). 
 144. For an explanation of USADA’s notice and appeal procedures for athletes who test 
positive, see Tygart, supra note 13, at 135–38. 
 145. Pub. L. No. 95-606, 92 Stat. 3045 (1978) (codified as amended at 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–
220529 (2000)) (giving an athlete the right to notice and a hearing in actions of their NGBs, 
among other things). 
 146. A thorough analysis of whether an athlete would have a property interest in his or her 
athletic career sufficient to trigger due process protections is outside the scope of this Paper.  For 
purposes of the state action analysis discussed here, it is assumed that a credible argument could 
be made in this regard. 
 147. The protections provided to accused athletes through USADA and under the Amateur 
Sports Act and those required by the Constitution, if USADA were found to be a state actor, 
might not differ in the final analysis.  However, the potential litigation that would arise if the 
Constitution were applied to USADA’s actions could significantly hamper the agency’s anti-
doping efforts. 
 148. See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 7 (keynote remarks of Barry 
McCaffrey). 
 149. Id. at 35 (statement of Mickey Ibarra, Dir. of White House Intergovernmental Affairs) 
(“[R]emoving an athlete from competition at that point [after positive test results but before a 
hearing] helps level the playing.”). 
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and Director of White House Intergovernmental Affairs, stated to the White 
House Task Force on Drug Use in Sports that the Amateur Sports Act, because 
of the due process protections, “ultimately undermines the overall effort that 
we have here. . . . If at some point [an athlete who tested positive is] put back 
because they win the adjudication, fine. . . .  But let’s get that athlete off the 
playing field . . . .”150  The former president of the USOC, Scott Blackmun, 
echoed these concerns, asserting that an athlete is not prohibited from 
competing without being first given a hearing because “the United States is a 
country with fundamental notions of due process.”151  Blackmun went on to 
state that the question is: “[S]hould those fundamental notions of due process 
really have application in sport and in doping?”152 
Due process challenges to anti-doping efforts are not new,153 and could be 
raised to challenge USADA’s actions in several areas.154  First, USADA 
applies a strict liability standard so that an athlete is responsible for any 
substance present in his or her body that is on the banned substance list even if 
the athlete did not intend to ingest the substance and has no knowledge of how 
it got there.155  Thus, to sanction an athlete, USADA need not show that the 
athlete intended to cheat.156  This feature is considered central to efforts to 
combat doping.157  In addition, due process challenges have been premised on 
whether the substance in question actually was performance enhancing.158  Due 
process challenges have also been made based on the doping standards 
themselves, and whether they provide credible evidence of a doping 
violation.159  Finally, in addition to challenging the procedures that led to the 
positive result, athletes have challenged the appeal procedures as well.160 
The importance to USADA’s operations in avoiding a finding of state 
action, and therefore constitutional challenges, is also illustrated in the events 
surrounding the investigation of several elite track and field athletes, including 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 56 (statement of Scott Blackmun, President of the USOC). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See Straubel, supra note 14, at 526–31 (discussing the cases of Olympic athletes Mary 
Slaney and the Nandrolone Four). 
 154. This Article will not determine what, if anything, due process might require for an 
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Marion Jones, in the months leading up to the 2004 Athens Olympics.  Jones 
was among those who were rumored to have obtained performance-enhancing 
drugs from BALCO, and USADA was investigating her and others for doping 
violations.161  Neither Jones nor any of the others under investigation had 
failed drug tests.162  Commentators argued that Jones was being unfairly 
tainted by USADA’s suggestions that she had used performance-enhancing 
drugs when she had not failed a drug test.163  In maintaining her innocence, 
Jones stated, “I am not going to engage in the United States Anti-Doping 
Agency’s secret kangaroo court.  I will answer questions in a public forum that 
will be open for the entire world to see, hear, and evaluate . . . .”164  Part of the 
frustration for Jones and the other targeted athletes included the fact that 
USADA asserted that it could change the required burden of proof for 
disqualifying an athlete while the investigations were underway.  When the 
doping violations allegedly had taken place, the applicable burden of proof was 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”165  During the investigations, however, USADA 
noted that the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), the 
world governing federation for track and field, had decided to adopt the 
standard used in the World Anti-Doping Code.166  That standard required only 
that doping cases be proven “to the comfortable satisfaction” of the sanctioning 
authority.167  USADA therefore asserted that it need no longer prove a doping 
case beyond a reasonable doubt.  Such a mid-stream change in the burden of 
proof could give rise to a constitutional due process challenge if USADA were 
in fact a state actor. 
III.  DOES THE CONSTITUTION APPLY TO USADA’S ACTIONS? 
There are two potential ways that USADA’s actions would trigger the 
constitutional rights of athletes affected by its actions.  First, the Constitution 
would apply to USADA if it were in fact a government entity.168  Second, the 
Constitution would apply to USADA’s actions if, although it were a private 
actor, USADA’s actions were “fairly attributable to the state” such that 
USADA was engaged in state action.169  An examination of USADA indicates 
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that it is likely not a government entity for constitutional purposes and that in 
the typical doping case, it is not engaged in state action.  However, in some 
unique circumstances, USADA’s actions may be “fairly attributable to the 
state.” 
A. Is USADA a Government Entity for Purposes of the Constitution? 
Congress has designated USADA as the “official anti-doping agency” for 
the United States.170  Accordingly, for Olympic and anti-doping purposes, 
USADA is an instrumentality of the United States.  The relevant question, 
however, is whether USADA is “an agency or instrumentality of the United 
States for the purpose of individual rights guaranteed against the Government 
by the Constitution.”171  It is important to note that in such an analysis, neither 
USADA’s, Congress’s, nor the Executive Branch’s characterizations of 
USADA’s status are determinative.172  As the Supreme Court has explained, 
“The Constitution constrains governmental action ‘by whatever instruments or 
in whatever modes that action may be taken.’”173 
Courts have considered the question of whether a corporation is a 
government entity in a variety of contexts, such as for purposes of sovereign 
immunity,174 tax immunity,175 and the application of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act.176  The Supreme Court’s decision in Lebron v. National 
Railroad Passenger Corp.177 is the leading case on determining whether a 
corporation is a government entity for constitutional purposes.  In that case, the 
Court considered a challenge to a decision by Amtrak to prohibit a politically 
themed billboard display in Amtrak’s Pennsylvania Station in New York.178  
The plaintiff, Lebron, claimed Amtrak’s refusal to permit the billboard space to 
be rented for such a purpose violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights.179  
The Court noted at the outset that while actions of private entities may 
“sometimes be regarded as governmental action for constitutional purposes,” 
such an inquiry was not necessary because the plaintiff correctly argued that, 
 
 170. Act of Nov. 12, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-67, § 644, 115 Stat. 514, 555. 
 171. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 394 (1995). 
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for constitutional purposes, “Amtrak [was] not a private entity but Government 
itself.”180 
The Court highlighted several factors that supported its conclusion that 
Amtrak was part of the government for constitutional purposes.  First, the 
Court noted that Amtrak was created by the Rail Passenger Service Act of 
1970 to further important government objectives regarding the “‘continuance 
and improvement’ of railroad passenger service.”181  Second, the Amtrak board 
was controlled by the government.182  The Act provided that the Amtrak board 
would consist of “nine members, six of whom are appointed by the President 
of the United States.”183  Two additional directors were to be appointed by the 
holders of Amtrak’s preferred stock, which was held at that time by the 
government.184  The ninth member of the board would be selected by the other 
eight directors.185  As a result, the Court noted that “Amtrak is not merely in 
the temporary control of the Government . . . [Amtrak] is established and 
organized under federal law for the very purpose of pursuing federal 
governmental objectives, under the direction and control of federal 
governmental appointees.”186  Additionally, the Act required Amtrak to submit 
annual reports to the President and Congress.187  The Court explained that the 
Act’s provision that Amtrak “will not be an agency or establishment of the 
United States Government,” was dispositive of Amtrak’s status only “for 
purposes of matters that are within Congress’s control,” and not for 
constitutional purposes.188  Accordingly, the Court held that “where, as here, 
the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of 
governmental objectives, and it retains for itself permanent authority to appoint 
a majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the 
Government for purposes of the First Amendment.”189 
A court considering USADA’s status for constitutional purposes likely 
would conclude that USADA is not part of the government under the Lebron 
analysis.  First, USADA is not a government-created corporation, but is instead 
incorporated under the laws of the state of Colorado as a nonprofit 
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corporation.190  Also, it does not currently have any special federal statute 
laying out its purpose or other requirements of existence.191  While USADA 
does operate with Congress’s designation that it is the official anti-doping 
agency for the United States,192 and it is undoubtedly subject to some reporting 
requirements with respect to the federal funding it receives, this is not the 
equivalent of the statute enacted by Congress to create Amtrak, which 
essentially codified the government’s permanent ability to control Amtrak’s 
operations.193  Second, the government does not have the statutory right to 
appoint USADA’s directors.  While it was at least initially contemplated that 
some of USADA’s directors would be appointed after consultation with 
ONDCP,194 there is no evidence that this is the case.  Even if some directors 
were, as a matter of practice, appointed after consultation with ONDCP, this 
would likely not be sufficient.  The Supreme Court stressed in Lebron that the 
ability to control the entity through the board must be “permanent” and the 
control must be exercised through appointment of the majority of the board of 
directors for the entity in question to be considered part of the government 
itself.195 
It might be suggested that the absence of a federal statute incorporating 
USADA should not be determinative, as it is clear that USADA was created 
with significant government involvement to serve important government 
objectives.  Indeed, the government worked in creating USADA with the 
USOC, itself a corporation created by Congress.196  Moreover, at least initially, 
ONDCP hoped USADA would be an agency of the government.197  There is 
nothing in Lebron, however, that suggests that such a status would be enough 
to make USADA a government entity.  The Court’s holding in Lebron was 
specific in that it applied to government-created corporations where the 
government retains permanent, controlling authority through the board of 
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directors.198  This level of control is simply not present with USADA.  
However, if it were discovered that in fact the government did exert the level 
of control over USADA that it exerted over Amtrak, it might not be 
determinative to the Court that such control is not specified in a federal statute.  
The Court made clear that the Constitution applied to governmental action in 
whatever form it took, and that it would not be swayed by declarations of an 
entity’s “private” status.199 
This restrictive view of Lebron, and its likely application to USADA, is 
consistent with case law.200  Particularly pertinent is a decision by the Ninth 
Circuit on whether the Red Cross was an instrumentality of the government for 
purposes of the First Amendment.201  In that case, the Court held that the Red 
Cross was not a government actor for constitutional purposes because “[t]he 
daily affairs of the Red Cross are not controlled by government officials.”202  
Moreover, the Court found it determinative that “the government [had] not 
retained permanent authority to appoint the majority of the Red Cross 
governing board . . . .”203  The Court found it irrelevant that the Red Cross was 
held to be a government instrumentality in other contexts and that the 
organization “performs many important functions for the United States” 
government.204 
Similarly, here, a court likely would find that USADA performs many 
important functions both domestically and internationally in serving the United 
States government’s Olympic Movement interests.  Moreover, like the Red 
Cross, USADA is in some aspects an instrumentality of the United States.  
USADA participates in international conferences and in other international 
anti-doping initiatives on behalf of the United States government.205  However, 
Lebron and Hall v. American National Red Cross make clear that an entity’s 
governmental status in one context is not determinative for purposes of 
applying the Constitution to the entity’s actions.206  As stated by the court in 
Hall, “Government-created corporations are often held to be tax-immune 
government instrumentalities, but courts have also frequently found them not 
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to be subject to constitutional treatment as government actors.”207  Therefore, 
like the Ninth Circuit in Hall, a court likely would find that USADA is not a 
government entity for constitutional purposes. 
B. Are USADA’s Actions Fairly Attributable to the State? 
Assuming that USADA is not a government entity, but is in fact private, 
the next inquiry in determining whether the Constitution applies to its actions 
is whether, in a particular case, USADA’s seemingly private action should be 
deemed that of the state for constitutional purposes.208  While it is clear that 
USADA enjoys a close relationship with the federal government, in most cases 
USADA’s actions likely could not be deemed that of the state for 
constitutional purposes.  However, the events leading up to the 2004 Athens 
Olympic Games show that in some instances, USADA’s actions might be 
fairly attributable to the state. 
Attributing seemingly private conduct to the government is difficult.209  
Indeed, the Supreme Court has found state action in few cases.  As the Court 
stated in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., requiring state action “preserves an area 
of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial 
power.  It also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, 
responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.”210  At 
bottom, it must be determined whether the challenged action is “fairly 
attributable to the State.”211 
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court, while noting that the doctrine is 
far from clear, has articulated a two-step inquiry for determining whether the 
challenged action is “fairly attributable to the State.”  First, it must be shown 
that the allegedly unconstitutional action was the result of “the exercise of 
some right or privilege created by the State.”212  Second, the Court has stated 
that in order to determine whether it is fair to attribute private actions to the 
state, the Court must determine “whether there is a sufficiently close nexus 
between the State and the challenged action.”213  The Court has articulated 
several theories for finding the requisite “close nexus.”  For instance, the Court 
has explained that it can be fair to attribute private action to the government 
where the state has “exercised coercive power or has provided such significant 
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encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed 
to be that of the State”214 or where the “private actor operates as a ‘willful 
participant in joint activity with the State or its agents[.]’”215  The Court has 
also found state action where a private actor is “controlled by an ‘agency of the 
State,’”216 or when the private actor has been delegated a function that has 
been “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.”217  More recently, 
the Court stated that the “pervasive entwinement” of state officials in the 
structure of an ostensibly private entity would be enough to support a finding 
of state action.218 
In short, the Court has made it clear that constitutional standards apply 
only “when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct” 
at issue.219  However, as the Court explained in Brentwood Academy v. 
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, the analysis of what conduct the 
state is “responsible for” is not one that is undertaken with reference to bright-
line rules or criteria.220  Instead, the Court stressed that there is not one set of 
facts or circumstances that establish state action, and that if state action is 
shown under one theory, it is not relevant that the facts might not amount to 
state action under a different test.221  As a result, the Court stated, “[E]xamples 
may be the best teachers . . . .”222 
1. Nothing Would Preclude a Finding of State Action Against USADA 
As an initial matter, it is likely that a court would find that USADA’s 
actions meet the first prong of the state action inquiry.  Because of its 
designation by Congress as the United States’ “official” anti-doping agency,223 
and its resulting exclusive authority to test and sanction all United States 
Olympic Movement athletes, USADA is exercising a right and privilege given 
to it by Congress. 
Thus, the remaining question is whether USADA’s actions are “fairly 
attributable to the State.”  One of the leading examples to be used in this 
analysis is the case of San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States 
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Olympic Committee,224 which involved a state action challenge to the 
USOC.225  It might be argued that because the Court in San Francisco Arts 
held that the USOC was not a state actor under the circumstances of that 
case,226 USADA likewise is not a state actor because it performs functions that 
were previously performed by the USOC.  Such an assumption, however, 
would misread San Francisco Arts and ignore key differences between the 
USOC and USADA. 
In San Francisco Arts, the USOC brought suit against San Francisco Arts 
and Athletics, Inc., an organization that was attempting to organize and 
promote the “Gay Olympic Games,” seeking to prohibit it from using the word 
“Olympic” in its materials.227  San Francisco Arts first argued that the Amateur 
Sports Act, which gave the USOC the exclusive right to control the use of the 
Olympic words and symbols, afforded the USOC nothing more than the usual 
trademark protection.228  As a result, San Francisco Arts argued it could rely on 
defenses provided by the Lanham Act.229  The Court disagreed, holding that 
the Amateur Sports Act granted the USOC exclusive use of the word Olympic, 
thereby providing more protection to Olympic marks and trademark than given 
in the usual trademark case.230  The Court found that this did not violate the 
First Amendment.231 
In addition, San Francisco Arts argued that the USOC’s enforcement of its 
exclusive right to the marks in this case violated Equal Protection under the 
Fifth Amendment.232  The threshold issue for the Court, therefore, was whether 
the USOC was a state actor such that the Constitution would apply to its 
actions.233  The Court noted that the USOC is a private corporation chartered 
by Congress.234  In the Amateur Sports Act, Congress imposed certain 
requirements on the USOC such as reporting on its operations and 
expenditures in a yearly report to Congress.235  In addition, the USOC received 
some federal funding.236  Aside from its relationship to the federal government 
as outlined in the Amateur Sports Act, there was no other evidence that the 
Government was involved in the trademark enforcement determinations that 
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the USOC made with respect to San Francisco Arts’ use of the word Olympic 
and accompanying marks.237 
The Court stated that on these facts, San Francisco Arts could not show 
state action.238  First, the Court explained that extensive regulation of a private 
entity “does not transform the actions of the regulated entity into those of the 
government.”239  Second, the Court stated that the USOC’s receipt of 
government funding did not change the analysis.240  The Court stated that 
“[t]he Government may subsidize private entities without assuming 
constitutional responsibility for their actions.”241  Finally, the Court held that 
state action could be found where the entity at issue “performs functions that 
have been ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative’ of the Federal 
Government.”242  While the Court acknowledged that the USOC’s activities 
served “a national interest,” it held that this fact was not enough to make the 
USOC’s actions governmental action.243  The Court held that “[n]either the 
conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports has been a traditional 
governmental function.”244  Significantly, the Court also explained that state 
action normally can only be found where the government has exercised “such 
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law 
be deemed to be that of the government.”245  The Court noted that in this case, 
there was simply no evidence that the government coerced or encouraged the 
USOC in its decision to deny San Francisco Arts the use of the Olympic 
mark.246 
Based on this, it cannot be said that the USOC is a private actor in all 
circumstances as a matter of law.247  San Francisco Arts stands for the 
proposition that the USOC is not a state actor under the “traditional public 
function theory” because the USOC does not perform functions that were 
traditionally the “exclusive prerogative” of the government.  The “public 
function” theory was San Francisco Arts’ primary argument that the USOC’s 
action amounted to state action, since it was unable to show that the challenged 
action, the denial of the use of the Olympic mark, had any specific relationship 
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to the United States Government.  There was no allegation that any member of 
the government even knew that the dispute over the use of the Olympic mark 
was occurring, much less that anyone connected to the government was 
involved in denying or otherwise “coercing or encouraging” the USOC to deny 
the plaintiffs the use of the mark.248  Thus, San Francisco Arts can only be read 
for the narrow holding that the USOC is not performing a traditional public 
function, and only under that theory is it not engaged in state action.  There is 
nothing in San Francisco Arts, however, that would preclude a finding of state 
action in other circumstances.  San Francisco Arts explicitly contemplated that 
where there is evidence of government coercion or encouragement of a USOC 
decision, a finding of state action could be appropriate.249  At most, then, San 
Francisco Arts would support the argument that USADA does not perform a 
traditional public function so that it is not a state actor under that theory.  San 
Francisco Arts clearly leaves open the possibility, however, that USADA 
could be a state actor, at least in some circumstances, if other indicia of state 
action are present. 
Still, even if San Francisco Arts could be construed as holding that the 
USOC is not a state actor in all circumstances as a matter of law, such a 
holding would not necessarily be applicable to USADA. USADA’s 
relationship with the federal government, both through the Executive Branch 
and with Congress, is meaningfully different than the relationship between the 
USOC and the federal government.  For instance, while the USOC is mostly 
self-supporting, and not reliant on government funding, USADA receives the 
majority of its operating budget from the federal government.250  Moreover, 
while the USOC has always been subject to Congressional oversight, USADA 
is subject to direction and influence not just by Congress but also the ONDCP, 
which has taken a direct interest in its operation.251  Accordingly, USADA’s 
actions in a specific case must be reviewed to determine whether they are fairly 
attributable to the government. 
2. USADA’s Actions Generally Will Not Be Fairly Attributable to the 
Government 
As explained above, for the Constitution to apply to USADA’s conduct, it 
must be shown that ultimately, the state is “responsible” for USADA’s actions 
such that USADA “may fairly be said to be a state actor.”252  An important 
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step in such an inquiry is to determine the specific conduct of which a plaintiff 
who brings suit against USADA would complain.253  Here, the challenged 
action would be the finding that an athlete had violated the relevant anti-
doping code.  Because in routine cases such a finding is not made with any 
government involvement, USADA’s actions likely would not be fairly 
attributable to the state. 
a. USADA Does Not Perform a Traditional Public Function 
The Supreme Court has explained that it is fair to attribute a private 
entity’s actions to the state where the entity performs a function that is 
“traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.”254  Such functions have 
been defined as those where the state is uniquely obligated to provide the 
services in question.255  It has been noted that this is an “arduous standard to 
satisfy.”256  In addition, the Supreme Court has made clear that a private actor 
that engages in conduct which is beneficial to the public does not transform its 
actions into state action.257  The Supreme Court has found a traditional public 
function to be present in only a narrow range of circumstances, such as the 
administration of elections258 and municipal parks.259  The Court has declined 
to find a traditional public function in cases involving the coordination of 
amateur athletics260 and the education of special needs children.261 
Given the Supreme Court’s restrictive approach to the traditional public 
function theory, it is clear that USADA does not perform a function that 
traditionally has been “the exclusive prerogative of the state.”  First, there is 
nothing which obligates the government to drug test Olympic Movement 
athletes.  While it can be argued that the international agreements the United 
States has entered into to fight doping obligate it to provide for drug testing of 
athletes, there is nothing that specifies the government itself must do the 
testing and apply the sanctions.  Second, drug testing in general has never been 
the exclusive prerogative of government.  Thousands of private entities use the 
practice to ensure that their employees, students, and the like are drug free.262  
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In fact, USADA’s own history shows that drug testing was not traditionally the 
exclusive prerogative of the government—it is because the anti-doping 
program was ineffectively handled by the USOC that the federal government 
got involved.263  Finally, given that the Supreme Court has found that the 
USOC is not performing a traditional government function, it is unlikely that a 
court would hold that USADA, which tests and sanctions athletes as part of the 
USOC’s overall eligibility determination process, is performing one. 
b. Substantial Government Funding and Regulation Are Not Enough to 
Support a Finding of State Action 
It is well settled that where a private actor is heavily regulated or where the 
state creates the legal framework for the challenged action, this alone is not 
enough for a finding of state action.264  Accordingly, although USADA 
receives about sixty percent of its operating budget from the federal 
government, and the government designated USADA as the United States’ 
“official” anti-doping agency, this falls short of the government involvement 
required for a finding of state action. 
Several cases are instructive in this regard.  For instance, in American 
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan,265 the Court considered 
whether there was state action in a case challenging a decision by a private 
insurer to withhold payment for medical services under a state workers’ 
compensation program.266  The state statute governing the program authorized 
employers to withhold payments for potentially unnecessary medical treatment 
pending utilization review.267  The Court held that such conduct was not fairly 
attributable to the state because the decision to deny payment for medical 
services was made by private insurers and the only involvement by the state 
was through the statute that authorized those private parties to make the 
challenged decision.268  The Court noted that the state’s decision to allow 
workers’ compensation insurers to withhold payment for medical services 
pending utilization review in some way can be seen as “encouraging” them to 
do so, but that “this kind of subtle encouragement is no more significant than 
that which inheres in the State’s creation or modification of any legal 
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remedy.”269  For state action to be found, the Court stated that there must be 
some “overt, significant assistance of state officials.”270 
This is similar to the holding in Blum v. Yaretsky.271  In that case, the 
Supreme Court held that the decisions of a nursing home subject to various 
Medicaid and other state regulations were not subject to constitutional 
attack.272  The Court noted that although the applicable Medicaid guidelines 
encouraged the hospital’s decisions to discharge its patients as soon as 
possible, the state was not “responsible” for those actions because the 
“decisions about which respondents complain are made by physicians and 
nursing home administrators, all of whom are concededly private parties.”273  
Similarly, in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,274 several teachers brought suit against a 
private school, asserting unconstitutional state action, after they were 
terminated for speaking out against the school’s director.275  Public funds made 
up 90–99% of the school’s budget, and students were transferred to the school 
pursuant to state law.276  With respect to the named petitioner, Rendell-Baker, 
a state board had to approve the initial hiring decision.277  In addition, that 
same state board upheld the school’s decision to terminate Rendell-Baker.278  
The Supreme Court held that despite the school’s close ties to the state, the 
decision to terminate the teachers was not subject to challenge on 
constitutional grounds because the decisions were not mandated or otherwise 
influenced by any state regulation.279  As a result, although the school was 
subject to extensive regulation, the Court found that there could be no state 
action because nothing indicated the state was involved in any way in the 
personnel matters at issue.280  The Court stated that the school’s decisions to 
discharge the petitioners were not compelled or influenced by state authority: 
“Indeed, in contrast to the extensive regulation of the school generally, the 
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various regulators showed relatively little interest in the school’s personnel 
matters.”281 
The case of Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company282 is also a useful 
example.  In that case, the plaintiff brought suit against Metropolitan Edison 
for terminating her electricity.283  The Court noted that while the electric 
company was privately owned and operated, it was subject to extensive state 
regulation.284  However, the Court rejected the argument that furnishing 
electricity was a power traditionally reserved to the state.285  Moreover, the 
Court held that the actions of the electric company were not state action 
because the state had not placed its “imprimatur” on the challenged action.286  
The Court explained that a private entity’s exercise of discretion permitted by 
statute, without additional state involvement, does not make the private entity’s 
action state action.287 
These cases are all consistent with the Court’s holding in San Francisco 
Arts, where the Court stated that the USOC’s actions were not subject to 
constitutional challenge because there was nothing in the record to indicate that 
the government had any interest in the USOC’s decision to deny the plaintiffs 
the right to use the Olympic trademarks.288  Therefore, where the challenged 
action is ultimately taken by private parties, and the only indicia of state 
involvement is funding and regulation, this is not enough for a finding of state 
action. 
Here, USADA is not as heavily regulated or dependent on government 
funding as the entities in American Manufacturers, Rendell-Baker, Blum, or 
Jackson.  However, similarly to those cases, it is a private entity that would 
perform the action subject to challenge.  Moreover, as in the above cases, there 
is nothing to indicate that the government would take any interest or 
involvement in the challenged action (here, routine athlete drug testing).  
While the federal government helped create USADA and places great weight 
on fighting doping, this alone would not be enough.  As the Court stated in 
Blum, “Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is 
not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible for those initiatives under 
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the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.”289  Accordingly, as in the cases 
discussed above, it is unlikely that a usual case involving a constitutional 
challenge to USADA’s actions, based merely on the federal government’s 
funding and oversight of USADA, would succeed. 
c. The Government is Not Pervasively Entwined in USADA’s 
Operations 
Another potential theory to demonstrate that USADA’s actions are fairly 
attributable to the government is that USADA is “pervasively entwined” with 
the government.290  This argument also likely would fail.  In Brentwood 
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, the Supreme Court 
found that a state high school athletic association was engaged in state action 
where the plaintiff demonstrated that the state was responsible for the decisions 
of the nominally private athletic association because public officials were 
pervasively entwined in the management and control of the association.291  In 
that case, the Court noted that the state was entwined from the “top down” in 
that employees of the state’s board of education sat on many of the athletic 
association’s committees, and because employees of the athletic association 
were part of the state retirement system.292  The state was also entwined from 
the “bottom up” in that an overwhelming majority of the members of the 
association were public high schools represented by school principals and 
others acting in their official capacities.293  The Court noted that “[t]here would 
be no recognizable [Athletic] Association, legal or tangible, without the public 
school officials, who do not merely control but overwhelmingly perform all 
but the purely ministerial acts by which the Association exists and 
functions . . . .”294 
In contrast, USADA is not in any way controlled on a day-to-day basis by 
public officials.  There are no public officials on USADA’s board of directors, 
and there are no public officials working in the day-to-day management of 
USADA.295  While at most it can be argued that the private individuals who 
control USADA are friendly to the government’s anti-doping agenda,296 this 
alone is not enough to show the type of “largely overlapping identity”297 that 
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was critical to the Court’s holding of “pervasive entwinement” in Brentwood.  
Accordingly, it is unlikely that a Court would find that USADA engaged in 
state action under this theory. 
d. In Most Cases, USADA’s Actions Are Not the Result of Joint Action 
with the Government or Significant Government Coercion or 
Encouragement 
The Supreme Court has held that state action may be found where a private 
entity is a “willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.”298  
In addition, the Court repeatedly has stressed that actions are fairly attributable 
to the state where the state has “exercised coercive power or has provided such 
significant encouragement . . . that the choice must in law be deemed to be that 
of the State.”299  In the usual case involving the testing and sanctioning of an 
athlete, there would be no evidence of joint action or significant coercion and 
encouragement sufficient to support a finding of state action. 
To establish state action based on a “joint action” theory, it must be shown 
that the private party took the challenged action with the “overt, significant 
assistance of state officials,”300 or has worked “in concert” with state officials 
to effectuate the deprivation of constitutional rights.301  Moreover, a showing 
of state action under the “coercion and encouragement theory” requires more 
than “mere approval or acquiescence,” or “subtle encouragement.”302  The 
level of government involvement under these theories of state action is not 
present in the typical drug testing case.  As USADA notes in its most recent 
annual report, it conducted a total of 7,360 drug tests during the year.303  Of 
these, it made forty-three “adverse findings.”304  It also issued sanctions in 
forty-one pending cases.305  Given this volume, it is hard to imagine how 
Congress or ONDCP or any other arm of the government would have the 
ability to be involved in USADA’s actions at the level required to support a 
finding of state action under these theories.  In addition, even if Congress and 
ONDCP remained informed of USADA’s day-to-day actions with respect to 
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testing and sanctions, there is simply no showing that Congress or ONDCP, in 
the usual case, has any interest in, or influence over, the outcome.  Most 
decisions subject to challenge would not be made by any government official, 
and government employees do not assist with testing or sanctioning athletes.  
Unlike cases where the “joint action” theory has been invoked, such as with 
pre-judgment attachment of property by ex parte application to a state 
official,306 or the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges,307 USADA does 
not need the participation of any state official to test and sanction athletes in 
routine cases.  Moreover, while the government clearly approves of and 
encourages generally the process of testing and sanctioning athletes, there is 
nothing to suggest that in the usual case, it coerces or significantly encourages 
USADA to take a specific action or reach a particular outcome.  Therefore, 
notwithstanding USADA’s substantial government funding and oversight, with 
respect to the typical doping case, a court is unlikely to hold that USADA’s 
actions are fairly attributable to the state. 
3. In Unique Circumstances, USADA’s Actions May Be Fairly 
Attributable to the State 
The conclusion that USADA’s actions, in routine doping cases, likely 
would not be fairly attributable to the government, however, does not mean 
that USADA could never be considered a state actor.  Indeed, USADA’s close 
relationship with the federal government may, under certain circumstances, 
make it particularly vulnerable to a finding of state action.  As the Supreme 
Court has stated, “Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the 
nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true 
significance.”308  Weighing the circumstances of USADA’s close relationship 
with the federal government with the events that occurred during the months 
leading up to the 2004 Athens Olympic Games illustrates that USADA may, in 
some cases, be a state actor. 
a. USADA’s Relationship with the Federal Government Positions It To 
Be a State Actor 
The Supreme Court’s requirement that for there to be state action there 
must be “a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged 
action”309 assumes that the state has a relationship with the private entity such 
that the state actually could coerce, encourage, jointly participate with, or 
otherwise control the private actor to achieve the challenged action.  USADA 
and the federal government have such a relationship. 
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First, both Lebron and Brentwood demonstrate that the government’s 
creation of a nominally private entity to serve important government interests 
positions the private entity for a finding of state action.  Here, as explained 
above, it was the government, particularly ONDCP and the Senate Committee, 
that took the lead in forming USADA.310As Michael Straubel noted, USADA 
was established and “assigned specific tasks with a set of preexisting 
guidelines.”311  Moreover, as in Lebron and Brentwood, because USADA was 
created to fulfill important government objectives, the federal government has 
a continuing interest in and influence over its operations.  This is illustrated 
when viewed in comparison to the United States’ professional sports leagues.  
For instance, when the World Anti-Doping Code was adopted, it was hoped 
that the National Basketball Association (NBA), National Football League 
(NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), and other American professional sports 
leagues would adopt it.312  The leagues refused, preferring instead to test and 
sanction their respective athletes pursuant to their collective bargaining 
agreements.313  In contrast, such a refusal to adopt the WADC was never an 
option for USADA.314  In addition, USADA’s role as an entity to serve 
government interests is further demonstrated with respect to the recent 
scandals involving performance-enhancing drug use and professional sports.315  
While holding hearings on the issue, Congress has explicitly considered 
expanding USADA’s jurisdiction to assist in coordinating drug testing for 
professional and college athletes.316  Indeed, when USADA was in the 
developmental stage, members of Congress and ONDCP hoped that by 
establishing USADA, the government could eventually fight the use of 
performance-enhancing drugs at both the professional and collegiate level.317  
As stated by Jim Scherr, during Congressional hearings on steroids and 
professional sports “it was suggested that perhaps USADA should be expanded 
to perform the same function for the professional leagues and perhaps the 
NCAA that it does for the American Olympic Movement. . . . [W]e believe 
that the proposal warrants serious consideration.”318  The ability of Congress 
even to consider “expanding” USADA demonstrates that USADA is not 
simply a private actor, but an entity that was created to serve important public 
objectives.  As a result, USADA is positioned to be influenced by the federal 
government in a way that supports a finding of state action. 
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Also illustrating USADA’s propensity to be influenced by the government 
is that the government has a mutually beneficial relationship with USADA.  
Such a mutually beneficial relationship can be important in establishing state 
action.319  First, USADA relies heavily on government subsidies in the form of 
grant funding through ONDCP.320  Significantly, in its four years of existence, 
USADA has received increasing financial support from the federal 
government.  For instance, in 2001, it received $3.3 million to support its 
operations.321  By 2004, the support had grown to more than $7.1 million.322  
Also significant is the fact that the funding requests are tied to expansion of 
USADA’s programs.323  Therefore, since its creation, USADA has seemingly 
become increasingly dependent on government funding.  USADA also has tax-
exempt status.324 
In addition to funding, USADA directly benefits from its relationship with 
the federal government in that it is designated by Congress as the United 
States’ official anti-doping agency.325  This designation provides USADA with 
the international and domestic authority and credibility it needs to achieve its 
mission.  Without such a designation, USADA would be unable to represent 
the United States internationally in such forums as the Council of Americas, 
the Council of Europe, and WADA.326  As stated by Terry Madden, the CEO 
of USADA, in testimony given for the White House Task Force on Drug Use 
in Sports, it was important to have the official “imprimatur” of the United 
States government so that USADA could be “invited to the table of the Council 
of Europe”327 and other international anti-doping conferences. 
The benefits USADA derives from its relationship with the federal 
government were even more important during the months leading up to the 
2004 Athens Olympics.  USADA was a fledgling organization, having been in 
existence for less than four years, and it relied heavily on the United States 
government for funding and domestic and international credibility.  Indeed, in 
2002 and 2003 USADA worked closely with Republican lobbyists who had 
close ties to the President to help it lobby for additional federal funding.328  As 
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a result, USADA during this time was especially concerned with cultivating its 
relationship with the United States government and continuing to receive the 
benefits it needed to establish itself. 
Likewise, the United States government greatly benefits from its 
relationship with USADA.  First, USADA enhances the United States’ image 
in the international Olympic Movement.  Prior to the creation of USADA, as 
mentioned above, the United States was embroiled in doping scandals that 
badly damaged its reputation.329  The perception was that the United States 
turned a blind eye to performance-enhancing drug use by its elite athletes.  
USADA, however, has enhanced significantly the United States’ credibility 
with respect to anti-doping, both at home and abroad.  Moreover, USADA 
benefits the federal government by actively supporting federal anti-drug 
initiatives.  Funding requests for USADA are made by ONDCP to Congress as 
part of ONDCP’s request for funds to implement other Federal Drug Control 
Programs.330  This is due to the fact that USADA was created not simply to 
drug test Olympic Movement athletes, but to educate children on the dangers 
of performance-enhancing drug use and to conduct research.331  Additionally, 
as noted above, some members of Congress now hope to use USADA to shape 
the drug testing and sanctions regimes of the major professional sports 
leagues.332 
USADA also is in a position to be influenced by the federal government 
because in many respects, it appears to be an agent of the government.333  
Again, as mentioned previously, USADA is designated as the United States’ 
official anti-doping agency.334  Such an official designation was found to be 
important in the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Brentwood, where the Court 
noted that the school board “[s]pecifically, in 1972 . . . went so far as to adopt a 
rule expressly ‘designating’ the Association as ‘the organization to supervise 
and regulate the athletic activities in which the public junior and senior high 
 
 329. See Straubel, supra note 14, at 554. 
 330. See ONDCP 2004 Budget Request, supra note 128 (addendum to statement of John P. 
Walters). 
 331. See 2002 USADA ANN. REP., supra note 326, at 3. 
 332. See Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2005). 
 333. In undertaking a state action inquiry, the Supreme Court has explained that “the 
character of a legal entity is determined neither by its expressly private characterization in 
statutory law, nor by the failure of the law to acknowledge the entity’s inseparability from 
recognized government officials or agencies.”  Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. 
Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001) (citing Lebron v. Nat’l. R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 US. 
374 (1995)).  Thus, even if USADA and the government maintained that USADA was a private 
entity, such a designation would not be determinative. 
 334. Act of Nov. 12, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-67 § 644, 115 Stat. 514, 555; see also S. 529 
Hearing, supra note 123 (testimony of Jim Scherr). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] DOES THE CONSTITUTION APPLY 131 
schools in Tennessee participate on an interscholastic basis.’”335  This 
designation was among the facts that tipped the scale in that case toward a 
finding of state action.336  Moreover, such a designation or apparent agency 
relationship was absent from cases where the Court held that government 
funding and government regulation, without more, was insufficient to support 
a finding of state action.337 
In addition to its official designation, USADA and its actions, in many 
cases, carry the imprimatur of the United States government.338  Such an 
“imprimatur,” or approval, can be important in finding state action.339  
USADA’s actions appear to be approved by the United States government 
because the very policies that USADA is enforcing, through the WADC, are 
policies that the United States not only has seen and approved, but had a part in 
drafting.  As explained above, the United States played a significant role in 
establishing WADA and establishing the WADC,340 which USADA now 
enforces.341  This is similar to the rules involved in Brentwood, where the 
Supreme Court noted that the state high school athletic association there had 
reviewed and approved of the rules at issue in the case.342  Here, not only has 
the United States government reviewed the WADC, it had a substantial hand in 
actually crafting it, and it retains the authority, through its position on the 
WADA board, to influence its shape in the future. 
Moreover, the “imprimatur” of the federal government is most apparent to 
the athletes who are tested and sanctioned by USADA.  For instance, when the 
 
 335. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 292 (quoting TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0520-1-2-.26 (1972), a 
provision later moved to Rule 0520-1-2-.08). 
 336. See id. at 300–02. 
 337. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 
U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 
419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
 338. It is important to note as an initial matter that USADA and the federal government’s 
designation of USADA as the “independent” anti-doping agency is not necessarily a statement of 
USADA’s relationship to the government.  In fact, the designation probably has less to do with 
asserting USADA’s independence from the federal government than an attempt to stress that it is 
separate from the USOC, so that the previous conflicts of interest present when the USOC 
handled the United States’ anti-doping program are no longer present.  Thus, this “independent” 
designation appears to be more about international credibility, and less a statement of its position 
vis-à-vis the federal government.  In any event, state action cases establish that this designation is 
not determinative. 
 339. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357. 
 340. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.  Indeed, even before WADA was formed and the 
WADC drafted the United States played a significant role in shaping Olympic Movement drug 
policy to serve domestic interests.  For instance, ONDCP pushed the IOC to make marijuana a 
banned substance.  See Kathy Orton, U.S. Supports New Drug Standards: McCaffrey Pledges $1 
Million Toward Advanced Olympic Testing, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1999, at D3. 
 341. 2005 USADA GUIDE TO PROHIBITED SUBSTANCES, supra note 110, at 2. 
 342. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 292 (2001). 
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BALCO scandal was unfolding, many athletes were aware of the Senate 
Committee’s assistance with USADA’s investigation of athletes for doping 
violations.  In responding to allegations that she had used THG, sprinter 
Marion Jones attempted to clear her name by offering to publicly answer any 
questions from USADA.343  Jones stated that “[w]e can answer these questions 
before the United States Senate, which has shown an interest in this 
matter . . . .”344  Moreover, as stated by Kelli White, a track and field athlete 
who admitted using BALCO-engineered steroids to the Senate Committee, “I 
appreciate the many reasons why this Committee previously subpoenaed the 
BALCO documents pertaining only to the track and field athletes and turned 
them over to USADA rather than the other sports, but would like to see a more 
equal treatment of all sports.”345  In short, the United States government, 
through ONDCP and Congress, has put its considerable “power and 
prestige”346 behind USADA, both domestically and internationally.  As such, 
USADA is markedly different from the private entities at issue in Jackson, 
American Manufacturers, Blum, Rendell-Baker and Moose Lodge, and 
therefore it is uniquely positioned to engage in state action. 
b. The Events Leading Up to 2004 Athens Olympic Games 
Positioned as it was to be a state actor, it is not surprising that USADA was 
significantly aided and encouraged by the federal government to target 
potential dopers in the months leading up to the 2004 Athens Olympic Games.  
These events, combined with the factors outlined above, would make a strong 
case for state action. 
In 2004, the BALCO scandal, and the professional and amateur athletes 
caught in it, was a matter of concern in the highest levels of government.  
Indeed, President Bush mentioned the issue of doping in sports in his State of 
the Union Address.347  These concerns increased in the spring of that year, as 
the United States was preparing to select its teams for the Athens Olympic 
Games.  Given the United States’ past reputation for allowing dopers to remain 
eligible for competition, there was intense pressure to ensure that the United 
States sent a “clean” team to the Games.348  Specifically, Senator John McCain 
and the Senate Committee were deeply concerned that track and field athletes 
implicated in the BALCO scandal might compete in Athens.349  Yet without 
the information from the BALCO grand jury investigation, USADA was 
 
 343. Sprinter Wants Public Dope Hearing, supra note 164. 
 344. Id. 
 345. S. 529 Hearing, supra note 123 (statement of Kelli White). 
 346. S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 559 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 347. See Bush, supra note 35, at 100. 
 348. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 349. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Com., Sci., and Transp., supra note 6. 
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seemingly powerless to bring doping cases against those who may have used 
the previously undetectable THG.  Accordingly, to prevent any BALCO-
tainted athletes from going to Athens, the Senate Committee subpoenaed 
documents from the Department of Justice that were part of the ongoing 
BALCO investigation.350  As stated by Senator John McCain: 
I continue to be keenly interested in curbing the use of banned performance-
enhancing drugs by our nation’s athletes.  To that end, this morning the 
Committee approved . . . the issuance of a subpoena . . . . [T]he subpoena 
would compel the Department of Justice to produce documents relating to U.S. 
amateur athletes’ alleged purchase of banned performance-enhancing 
substances from [BALCO] and their possible use of such substances.351 
The Department of Justice did not object to the subpoena, as would be 
expected, but in fact was “happy” to comply.352  It was widely reported that 
such willing compliance—turning over secret grand jury testimony to 
Congress during an ongoing investigation—was highly unusual, and “virtually 
without precedent.”353  After the material was provided to the Senate 
Committee, the Committee turned the material over to USADA.  This action 
was explained in a Senate Resolution, which stated, in pertinent part: 
Whereas, when it appears that evidence under the control or in the possession 
of the Senate is needed for the promotion of justice, the Senate will take such 
action as will promote the ends of justice consistent with the privileges of the 
Senate: Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved, That the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, acting jointly, are authorized to 
provide to the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency the documents subpoenaed by the 
Committee regarding the potential use of banned, performance-enhancing 
drugs by U.S. Olympic sport athletes.354 
As stated by Senator Ted Stevens, during a hearing on a bill to increase 
funding to USADA, “The actions that we took as a Committee last year 
ensured that the United States did not send athletes who were not drug-free to 
Athens.  Those were unprecedented actions . . . .”355 
 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. 
 352. See Ford Fessenden, Government’s Handling of Evidence from BALCO Case is Not 
Typical, N.Z. SPORTS DRUG AGENCY NEWS, Nov. 5, 2004, http://www.nzsda.co.nz/news.php? 
type=archive&nid=176. 
 353. Slot, supra note 5 at 46.  But see Mark Fainaru-Wada & Lance Williams, Steroid 
Scandal May Hit Olympics: U.S. Athletes Could Get Yanked—Even without Drug Tests, S.F. 
CHRON., May 16, 2004, at A1 (noting that the subpoenaed material did not include grand jury 
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 354. 150 CONG. REC. S5004 (daily ed. May 6, 2004) (statement of Sen. Frist). 
 355. S. 529 Hearing, supra note 123. 
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A strong argument can be made that the Senate Committee’s efforts to 
assist USADA in taking action against certain athletes356 constituted the 
requisite “joint action” with, and significant encouragement of, the federal 
government to support a finding of state action.357  As explained above, it is 
well established that a private party engages in state action where it jointly 
participates with the state in taking the challenged action.358  Courts have noted 
this requires a showing of overt and significant state participation in the 
challenged action, or a clear “concerted effort” between the state and the 
private entity.359  This level of participation and cooperation between USADA 
and the federal government was evident in the actions taken to secure sanctions 
against athletes implicated in the BALCO scandal leading up to the Athens 
Olympic Games. 
First, the decision to pursue sanctions against athletes based on information 
obtained from the BALCO investigation was done in concert with the federal 
officials, specifically the Senate Committee, who provided USADA with 
material obtained as part of a government investigation.  Such a joint effort 
likely would be enough of a close nexus to support a finding of state action.  
For instance, in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,360 the Court found state action 
where a public official, the local sheriff, facilitated the challenged action.361  In 
that case, a private party to whom the plaintiff was allegedly indebted filed an 
ex parte petition for attachment of the plaintiff’s property.362  The county 
sheriff executed the petition.363  At a subsequent hearing, the plaintiff 
established that the private creditor had not properly established grounds for 
attachment.364  The plaintiff then brought suit for violation of his due process 
rights.365  The Supreme Court held that the sheriff’s “joint participation” with 
 
 356. It is unclear which athletes were implicated in the documents, as the contents have not 
been made public.  However, after receiving the BALCO information from the Senate 
Committee, USADA began proceedings against track and field athletes Tim Montgomery, Alvin 
Harrison, Chryste Gaines, and Michelle Collins for “potential” doping violations.  See Tim 
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see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). 
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the private party to seize the plaintiff’s property was sufficient to characterize 
that party as a state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.366  
Similarly, the Supreme Court found state action in Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete, Co.,367 where the Court held that a private litigant engaged in state 
action in the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges because of the 
“overt, significant[,]” and “indispensable” participation of the court.368 
Here, a court could find that the federal government did not simply 
authorize and approve of USADA’s actions,369 it indispensably aided and 
encouraged them.  Like the private party’s reliance on the sheriff in Lugar, and 
the private litigant’s use of peremptory challenges in Edmonson, but for the 
Senate Committee’s involvement, USADA probably could not have obtained 
access to the grand jury material and made a case for sanctions against 
otherwise “clean” athletes.370  Moreover, far from having a neutral connection 
to USADA’s actions, the Senate Committee subpoenaed the grand jury 
materials for a singular purpose—preventing certain athletes from going to the 
Athens Olympics.  This is very likely the type of “overt, significant assistance” 
and “encouragement”371 with the force of the government’s “power and 
prestige”372 that can be sufficient to support a finding of state action. 
The case for state action is also strong in these circumstances because the 
level of interest and involvement in the operations of USADA on the part of 
the Senate Committee distinguishes USADA’s relationship with the federal 
government during the months leading up to the Athens Olympics from the 
relationships between the private actors and the state in Moose Lodge, Jackson, 
Blum, Rendell-Baker, American Manufacturers, and San Francisco Arts.  In 
none of those cases did the state take any interest in, or have any involvement 
with, the challenged actions.  In fact, there was nothing to suggest that the state 
in those cases had any direct knowledge that the challenged actions even took 
place.  Here, in contrast, the Senate Committee was heavily involved in the 
investigation and in the pursuit of sanctions against BALCO-implicated 
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athletes.373  It is precisely this type of “concerted effort”374 that can support a 
finding of state action. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
While USADA is not a government entity, neither is it a typical private 
corporation.  USADA was created by Congress and ONDCP to serve 
important government objectives both domestically and internationally.  
USADA is heavily subsidized by the government, and it operates with the 
government’s “imprimatur.”  The federal government, through its involvement 
with WADA, has important influence over USADA’s testing and sanctions 
policies.  Yet it is clear that despite the government’s substantial involvement 
with USADA, in the usual case, USADA’s actions would not be fairly 
attributable to the state.  The federal government generally has no interest or 
involvement in the typical doping case handled by USADA.  In addition, the 
federal government has no day-to-day control over USADA.  However, 
because of its close relationship with the federal government, USADA is 
vulnerable to the type of government involvement with and influence over its 
actions that could support a finding of state action.  In unique situations, such 
as that which took place in the months leading up to the Athens Olympic 
Games in 2004, a strong argument can be made that USADA’s actions are 
fairly attributable to the state. 
 
 
 373. The government remains involved in USADA’s efforts in this regard.  Terry Madden, 
USADA’s Chief Executive Officer, recently testified before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation that “we continue to work with the Department of Justice and the 
United States Attorney for the Northern District of California in the ongoing investigation into the 
BALCO doping conspiracy.”  S. 529 Hearing, supra note 123 (testimony of Terry Madden). 
 374. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991) (citing Shelly v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948)) (state action may be found where “the injury caused is 
aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority”). 
